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The Determination of the Money Supply:  Flexibility versus Control 
 
By C.A.E. Goodhart1 
Financial Markets Group 
London School of Economics 
 
 
I. The Monetary Base, Money Multiplier Story 
 
Until a relatively few years ago the determination of the money supply was generally taught in 
textbooks in terms of the monetary base, money multiplier story, which had been given prominence 
as the analytical basis for the great book on US monetary history by Friedman and Schwartz (1963).  
In reality this story was incorrect.  Although the money multiplier is derived from an identity,2 the 
causal direction works in exactly the reverse direction to that normally supposed in such texts.  The 
Central Bank normally decides on the official short term interest rate that it wants to set, and the 
two key ratios, the currency/deposit (C/D) ratio and the desired reserve/deposit rate of the banks 
(R/D), determine the monetary base that the Central Bank has to create if it is to keep short-term 
market rates in line with the intended official rate.  In truth, it is not so much a money multiplier, as 
a money divisor, which determines how much base money is consistent with the stock of money 
(M)3 and the two key ratios (C/D and R/D) at the chosen level of interest rates. 
                                                          
1   My thanks are due to Tim Congdon, David Green, David Laidler, Mervyn King, Ed Nelson, Carolyn Sissoko 
and David Walker for comments on this paper.  But any remaining errors are my own responsibility. 
 
2    M Ξ D + C  (1) 
 H Ξ R + C  (2) 
 Divide (1) by (2) to get, by manipulation 
 M ΞH  _(1 + C/D)_ (3) 
              (R/D+C/D) 
 
3   How far were the earlier great monetary economists, such as Cagan, Friedman and Schwartz, who 
nevertheless used the money multiplier as their framework for analysing the determination of the supply of 
money, aware of this two-way relationship?  They were, up to a point, see below, but a proper answer would 
deserve a much more detailed study of the history of theory in this respect than time has yet permitted. 
 
Thus David Laidler, in personal correspondence, wrote that  
 
“the best applications of the money multiplier as a framework of empirical analysis, e.g. Cagan, Friedman and 
Schwartz ….. always framed the interactions here as running in both directions, and with a crucial dynamic 
element to them as well, in which for example, setting r leads to variations in HPM and M (linked by not a rigid 
but a rather flexible multiplier), variations in PY, all of which might then prompt the authorities to vary r . . . 
and so on. I think that this is a very old story, going back to Thornton, with its origins here muddied by those 
usury laws, but its not far from Marshall, Fisher, and Hawtrey either.”  
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It is an obvious fact that the Central Bank, via its monetary policy committee, (MPC in the UK, or 
FOMC in the USA), sets the interest rate, and not, (prior to the attainment of the zero lower bound 
(ZLB)), the growth rate of the high-powered monetary base (H).  So there was a patent inconsistency 
in much, perhaps most, earlier monetary economics.  When discussing current public policy issues, 
monetary economists would advocate that the MPC change the official short rate to such and such 
an extent, whereas in their theoretical analysis they would assume that the authorities set the 
monetary base (H), thereby allowing short-term interest rates to be set by market forces to equate 
the demand and supply of money, (Goodhart 2009). 
 
This inherent inconsistency continued for decades, troubling only a small minority of analysts.  What 
has now given the money multiplier story the coup de grace is the recent experience during the 
Great Financial Crisis.  Once the official desired short-term interest had reached the zero lower 
bound (ZLB) in early 2009, there was no further need to control the growth of H in order to maintain 
a desired positive level of official short-term interest rates.  Instead, to enhance the degree of 
monetary expansion, the monetary base was raised massively via Quantitative Easing (QE).  But 
rather than promoting a roughly equivalent rise in the broader monetary aggregates, the money 
multiplier totally collapsed.4  The broader monetary aggregates stagnated at the same time as the 
monetary base expanded dramatically. 
 
A few numerical examples are shown in Table 1 below:- 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
While Edward Nelson wrote,  
“Lloyd Mints, Friedman’s graduate teacher in monetary matters, wrote much earlier of ‘the prevailing 
fact that the quantity of money is actually a function of the volume of bank lending.’ 
 
With regard to H responding to M and not just vice versa under an interest-rate peg, there is an 
acknowledgment of this in for example page 566 of the Monetary History.” 
 
4   There was a somewhat similar collapse in the money multiplier in the Great Depression in the 1930s, but for 
rather different reasons, i.e. a sharp change in the desired C/D ratio, rather than in the desired R/D ratio. 
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Table 1 
 % change in 
 H 
Monetary Base 
M 
Broad Money 
Ratio 
M/H 
US 2009 22.5 3.7 -15.3 
2010 0.6 3.6 2.9 
2011 31.2 9.7 -16.4 
2012 2.9 8.2 5.1 
2013 39.3 5.4 -24.3 
2014 5.9 5.9 0.0 
    
Japan 2009 5.2 2.2 -2.8 
2010 7.0 1.8 -4.9 
2011 13.8 2.6 -9.8 
2012 12.5 2.1 -9.2 
2013 47.7 3.3 -30.1 
2014 39.1 2.9 -26.1 
    
UK 2009 109.7 5.6 -49.6 
2010 -1.3 5.5 6.9 
2011 14.0 -3.1 -15.1 
2012 50.5 0.2 -33.4 
2013 7.6 0.7 -6.5 
2014 1.5 -0.1 -1.6 
    
Eurozone 2009 -8.2 -0.5 8.3 
2010 2.7 -0.7 -3.3 
2011 25.1 2.2 -18.3 
2012 22.7 3.0 -16.1 
2013 -26.7 0.5 37.1 
2014 -0.2 4.8 5.0 
 
 
Against this background, it has become, in practice, impossible to continue with the fiction that the 
Central Bank sets the money stock by varying the monetary base within a system in which there was 
a predictably stable money multiplier.  With the monetary base/money multiplier theory thus 
discredited, a search has now started for a new, revised paradigm to explain the determination of 
the supply of money. 
 
Against this background, of the need to re-examine theories of the determination of the money 
stock, we shall start in Section 2 with a re-statement of the array of current and prior such theories, 
particularly emphasising their weaknesses.  Indeed, no fully satisfactory analytical approach is 
currently available. 
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Banking is essentially a service industry; its special service is to provide access to liquidity for its 
clients.  But client demand for such access, and bank willingness to provide it, are procyclical; such 
cycles can, and do from time to time, exhibit boom/bust characteristics, with often damaging 
implications for the real economy and for price stability.  So we move on in Section 3 to a normative 
discussion of the optimal balance between the control of monetary expansion and flexibility in 
allowing client access to money, via borrowing from banks.  This conflict between ‘control and 
‘flexibility’ also mirrors the long-running debate between the ‘Currency’ and ‘Banking’ Schools.  I also 
try to relate this discussion to the proposals put forward by Lord King, former Governor of the Bank 
of England, in Chapter 7, entitled ‘Innocence Regained: Reforming Money and Banking’, of his book, 
The End of Alchemy.  As will be seen, I suggest some refinements to King’s proposals. 
 
II. Money Supply Theories 
 
In this Section, we will outline four differing theories of money supply theory, focussing primarily on 
the weaknesses of each.  These four theories are set out schematically in Table 2, roughly in the 
order in which they appeared and took centre stage. 
 
Table 2 
Money Supply Theories 
 
  
Theory 
Role of 
Commercial 
Banks 
Private 
Sector 
Central Bank Treasury Fiscal 
Policy 
A Deposits cause Loans Passive Dominant Background Background 
B Money Base 
Multiplier 
Just vary 
R/D ratio 
Just varies 
C/D ratio 
Dominant Ignored 
C Credit Counterpart Quite passive Major role Several 
Roles 
Major Role 
D Loans create Deposits Dominant Background Background Ignored 
 
 
II(A)  
Theory A, that deposits create booms, has been the commercial bankers’ theory.  In this bankers are 
relatively passive, except that they can offer better terms and conditions to clients.  They then wait 
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passively for cash and cheques drawn on other banks to be placed with them, and, if the net inflow 
is positive, they then decide how to distribute the net inflow amongst alternative assets.  Similarly, if 
the net flow is outwards, they decide how to meet that cash drain, initially by running down cash 
and Central Bank (CB) reserves, but ultimately by an overall portfolio rearrangement. 
 
The initial weakness in that story is that banks buy assets, and make loans, by writing up both sides 
of their balance sheet, so there is no initial loss of cash reserves.  But, if we assume, as was 
historically realistic, that we have a banking system of many banks, then any single bank making 
loans, or buying assets, faster than its peers, can expect a nearly commensurate loss of cash 
reserves.  The problem is not that the theory ignores the fact that banks pay for assets initially by 
creating a liability on themselves, but rather that the theory, although historically a reasonable 
representation of the reality facing an individual bank(er), tells us nothing about the forces driving 
the determination of the aggregate money stock.   
 
The relevance of this theory, which emphasizes the relative passivity of the individual bank(er), was 
much further weakened by the growth of wholesale money markets, from the 1960s onwards.  In so 
far as these markets were broad, deep and liquid, (and large relative to the size of the individual 
bank), each banker could plan the disposition and size of their asset portfolio independently of 
worrying about their retail deposit base!  A shrinkage in that base could be offset by more wholesale 
borrowing.  It was only when such wholesale markets became dysfunctional in 2008/9 that the prior 
verities of traditional deposit banking came back into focus.  Before then wholesale money markets 
allowed bankers to plan their strategies for the objectives of expansion, profitability and risk 
avoidance largely independently of the fluctuations in their traditional deposit base, (n.b. the US 
investment banks, the initial centre of the crisis, had a zero traditional deposit base). 
 
II(B) 
Theory B, the money base multiplier theory, was developed in the inter-war period with the aim of 
explaining fluctuations in the aggregate money supply, by economists such as Keynes (1930) and 
C.A. Phillips (1920).  As such, it abstracted entirely from the portfolio redistribution exercises going 
on in the background in individual banks.  The basis for this theory was that the ultimate, top-level, 
high-powered source of payment settlement was under the complete monopoly control of the CB, 
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and hence could be varied so as to provide a dominant influence over the total of the second-level, 
broad money stock.  If such base money, H, was fixed in total by the CB, all that remained for the 
private sector was to distribute that between bank reserves at the CB (the R/D ratio) and CB 
currency held by the public (the C/D ratio).  Moreover, bank reserve deposits at the CB and currency 
had zero yields, so under normal circumstances banks could be expected to hold a stable minimum 
(R/D) ratio and the public to hold a relatively stable (C/D) ratio; so an injection of new H of X% could 
lead to a rise of M of approximately X% also, (a roughly stable money base multiplier). 
 
An immediate problem for this theory was that in crisis, abnormal times, with bank solvency under 
threat, either the C/D ratio, as in the USA in 1931-33, or the R/D ratio, after 2008/9, could (and did) 
vary enormously.  So the base money multiplier would be stable, except under those conditions 
when one most needed stability, when it would become highly unstable.  But, according to Friedman 
and Schwartz (ibid), this need not be an insuperable problem since each CB could track the four 
variables involved on an almost continuous basis and hence vary H so as to offset any effects of 
unwanted changes of R/D and C/D on M. 
 
A much more serious drawback of this theory was that, while CBs could, in principle, have managed 
the money and banking system in this way, in practice they did not do so.  Instead they have chosen 
to set an official short-term interest rate.  That interest rate is one of the key variables determining 
the monetary behaviour of banks, investors and savers, and hence the current rate of growth of the 
broad money stock.  Given M, the R/D and C/D desired ratios then determine how much H the CB 
has to create to be consistent with its official short-term interest rate (i).  The money base multiplier 
actually works in reverse. 
 
Why did CBs choose to set i, rather than H?  Basically CBs are interested in variables of direct 
relevance to people, such as the exchange rate, the rate of inflation, the unemployment rate, etc., 
rather than in the size of the monetary aggregates, a statistical abstraction of no immediate public 
concern.  Given the variability of velocity and of demand for money functions, e.g. as revealed in the 
1980s, the ability of CBs to control the relevant ultimate target variables was greater via operating 
directly on i, than by setting M and then letting i be determined in money markets.  Moreover fixing 
M would normally have led to great short-term volatility in i, in view of the relative short-term 
interest inelasticity of the demand for R and C, whereas setting i would not lead to such short-term 
7 
 
volatility in M.5  So the efficiency of the banking structure would be reduced under a monetary base 
control (mbc) system.  This was a bone of contention in the UK in the early 1980s. 
 
Some of those academics in closer touch with official money market operations, such as Richard 
Sayers, did realise that the authorities had to keep short-term money market rates, such as Treasury 
Bill rates, in line with Bank rate, and hence they sought in their writing to shift the fulcrum for the 
working of the base multiplier from H, the liabilities of the CB, to the wider base of liquid assets 
available to the banks, see later editions of Modern Banking (e.g. Fifth Edition, 1960) and the 
Radcliffe Report (1959).  But this concept and definition of liquidity was less clear than that of base 
money, e.g. the commercial banks could create their own liquid assets, by lending via commercial 
bills, and this revision to the multiplier theory never really caught on. 
 
One reason for the attraction of the money base multiplier theory was that, with bank reserve 
deposits at the CB bearing a zero interest rate, banks receiving additional reserves would normally 
be keen to use such funds expeditiously to invest in higher yielding investments.  But, as Bernanke 
has written (2015, p. 325), 
“in 2008, we needed the authority to solve an increasingly serious problem: the risk that our 
emergency lending, which had the side effect of increasing bank reserves, would lead short-
term interest rates to fall below our federal funds target and thereby cause us to lose 
control of monetary policy.  When banks have lots of reserves, they have less need to 
borrow from each other, which pushes down the interest rate on that borrowing – the 
federal funds rate.” 
 
The rise in commercial bank reserves subsequently became so large, e.g. as a consequence of 
Quantitative Easing (QE), in all other developed countries as well as the USA, that short-term money 
market interest rates would get pushed down to whatever level was paid on such reserves.  The 
interest rate payable on commercial bank deposits now has become the effective determinant of 
short-term money market rates.  Moreover, it is a riskless rate, and holding such reserve deposits 
now involves no capital backing, (with the UK FPC removing such reserve deposits from leverage 
ratio requirements in August 2016, as they were already removed from Risk Weighted Asset (RWA) 
requirements).  Consequently banks now find themselves in something of a liquidity trap, where 
                                                          
5   There is the counter-argument that if M (or its growth rate) is fixed in the longer term, then the economy 
remains stable, whereas if i remains fixed the economy becomes unstable.  True, but no one advocated 
holding i fixed as inflation and the output gap varied. 
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holding additional  reserve deposits at the CB is as good, or better, as a use of funds than expanding 
any other potential assets.  The reserve base of commercial banks has sky-rocketed, and the base 
multiplier has ceased to work even in principle.  Commercial banks are now in a position where 
future injections, or withdrawals up to a limit, of reserve balances will have no more than a minor, 
second-order effect on their strategic dispositions. 
 
The money base multiplier almost never operated in practice; now it is defunct even in theory and in 
principle.   
 
II(C) The Credit Counterparts Approach 
Whereas academics seemed unconcerned about espousing a theory (the monetary base multiplier) 
so at odds with the facts, Central Banks knew at first hand that they generally aimed to set a short-
term interest rate, and then manipulated open market operations so as to achieve conditions in 
markets consistent with that prior choice.  If the CB set i rather than H, what then determined the 
supply of M? 
 
The answer that was then commonly given rested on another balance sheet identity, that bank 
assets equalled bank liabilities.  Thus one could set out a (simplified) bank balance sheet as follows:- 
Liabilities Assets 
Deposits Bank Lending to Private Sector 
Other Liabilities (e.g. equities) Bank Lending to Public Sector 
 Net External Assets 
 
Furthermore bank lending to the public sector was definitionally equal to the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement less debt sales to non-banks.  This had the merit, in the eyes of Central 
Bankers, of tying the determination of the money stock to three key policy concerns, fiscal policy 
(PSBR), funding policy (debt sales to non-banks), and credit control (bank lending to the private 
sector).  Moreover, being based on banks’ balance sheets, it was (relatively) comprehensive, and 
fitted nicely into a flow of funds framework, a framework which has regularly promised more 
analytical insights than has been delivered. 
9 
 
 
So, on this view the supply of money was the residual outcome of all other external forces operating 
on banks’ balance sheets.  But what if the demand for money was greater than this residual supply?  
Then the private sector could replenish its insufficient M holdings by borrowing more from banks, by 
buying less public sector debt or by selling foreign assets to government or to the banks. 
 
But this approach had numerous drawbacks.  It worked best if the M aggregate that was the focus of 
attention formed the bulk of bank liabilities.  If narrow money, M1, excluding time deposits, etc., 
was the focus, then potentially large shifts between time and sight deposits, for example on account 
of changes in relative interest rates, would make a credit counterparts approach of doubtful use.  
More recently, the growing utilisation of wholesale money market funds, not included in broad 
money, to finance bank assets plus banks’ ability to securitise, and to park assets in non-bank 
vehicles, has put the validity of this approach into serious question.  If banks can, and do, adjust 
primarily now via such market mechanisms, wholesale funding and securitisation, what then 
determines M?  is M now purely demand determined, with balance sheet adjustment obtained via 
these market mechanisms?  Has the aggregate link between bank assets and deposit liabilities 
become so weak that the credit counterparts approach has reached its ‘sell-by’ date? 
 
There are other problems as well.  By looking, in effect, at all the elements of bank balance sheets, 
with bank deposit liabilities becoming the residual, the approach could be described as a 
comprehensive description of the main factors affecting that balance sheet, rather than a theory.  
Moreover, the focus in this approach is on the factors, external to the banks, influencing the context 
in which they have to operate.  Prior to the implementation of Competition and Credit Control in 
1971, this was largely justified, since the interest rate cartel severely restricted banks’ ability and 
willingness to compete for business. 
 
Since 1971, however, banks have had much more lee-way to pursue their own time-varying 
objectives of profitability, expansion and risk avoidance, by a mixture of (market) mechanisms, such 
as interest rate competition, competition on lending terms, e.g. collateral requirements, wholesale 
funding, securitisation, etc., etc.  Against this background, it is doubtful whether the credit 
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counterparts approach, (though it was on this view the best available approach in earlier decades), is 
now worthy of resuscitation. 
 
II(D) The New Paradigm?  Bank loans create deposits. 
With commercial banks having, and using, the freedom, since 1971, to become more, or less, 
expansionary, this has now led to a new approach which puts commercial bank action in providing 
loans to the private sector at centre stage.  As noted earlier, in many, but not all, cases a bank makes 
a loan, a term loan to a corporate, or a mortgage loan to a person, by simultaneously writing up both 
its asset book (loan to X) and its liabilities (deposit of X).  That loans create deposits has been a 
(reasonably) well-known fact for a century, or more; this argument is, for example, to be found in 
Dennis Robertson’s textbook on Money, first published in 1922. 
 
This argument, that loans create deposits and, thus, that commercial banks themselves determine 
the supply of money, has the considerable advantage that it is partially true, unlike the monetary 
base/money multiplier story which got the whole process the wrong way around, the reverse of 
truth.  So, initially, I quite welcomed this line of thought.  But it is, at best, only partially true, as I 
shall recount shortly, and the policy implications that some adherents of this approach draw from it, 
for example that commercial banks’ capacity to create loans and deposits needs to be further 
curtailed or removed, need to be treated sceptically.  This is, perhaps, all the more important since 
this analytical approach appears to be receiving the imprimatur of the Bank of England. 
 
Two recent examples are McLeay, Radia and Thomas (2014), and Jakab and Kumhof (2015).6  The 
summaries of these two papers are as follows:- 
 
First, MacLeay, Radia and Thomas, 
 “This article explains how the majority of money in the modern economy is created by 
commercial banks making loans. 
                                                          
6   Also see Ryan-Collins, et al. (2011), and Werner (2014 a and b). 
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 Money creation in practice differs from some popular misconceptions — banks do not act 
simply as intermediaries, lending out deposits that savers place with them, and nor do they 
‘multiply up’ central bank money to create new loans and deposits. 
 The amount of money created in the economy ultimately depends on the monetary policy of 
the central bank. In normal times, this is carried out by setting interest rates. The central 
bank can also affect the amount of money directly through purchasing assets or 
‘quantitative easing’.” 
 
Next, Jakab and Kumhof, 
“Abstract 
In the intermediation of loanable funds model of banking, banks accept deposits of 
pre-existing real resources from savers and then lend them to borrowers. In the real 
world, banks provide financing through money creation. That is they create deposits 
of new money through lending, and in doing so are mainly constrained by 
profitability and solvency considerations. This paper contrasts simple intermediation 
and financing models of banking. Compared to otherwise identical intermediation 
models, and following identical shocks, financing models predict changes in bank 
lending that are far larger, happen much faster, and have much greater effects on 
the real economy.” 
 
There are, perhaps, three main reasons for being sceptical whether this new view really provides a 
significantly improved general theory of the determination of the money supply, because:- 
(a) It is only a partial approach, focussing on just one segment of banks’ portfolios; 
(b) It exaggerates the role of banks in initiating private sector credit expansion; 
(c) It does not show how the equilibrium portfolio position is to be achieved. 
 
II(D)(a) Bank Finance of the Public Sector 
A purchase by a commercial bank of public sector paper, a bond or a bill, creates money in exactly 
the same way as does a bank loan to the private sector.  The bank buys the bond, say, and pays for it 
by crediting the seller with a cheque written upon itself.  As noted earlier, the recipient of a loan is 
no more likely to keep the proceeds on deposit with the same bank than is the seller of the 
government bond to the bank. 
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But we tend not to think of bank lending to the public sector as being the initiating factor in creating 
money, in the same way as many do think of bank lending to the private sector as creating money.  
This is because banks are the passive residual providers of finance to the public sector.  When the 
government runs a fiscal deficit, not covered by debt sales to the non-bank public, the excess 
spending is financed in the first instance by creation of monetary base, which mostly ends up in 
larger commercial bank deposits at the Central Bank.  The commercial banks then, effectively, have 
the choice of how to distribute their portfolio of claims on the public sector between deposits at the 
Central Bank, Treasury Bills, short-dated bonds, etc.  This latter portfolio choice will depend on 
relative expected rates of return, perceived (interest rate) risk, liquidity requirements, etc. 
 
So whether a bank expanding its asset portfolio does so by writing up its own liabilities is not the key 
issue, which is, instead, which party to the transaction, the borrower or the lender, plays the key role 
in initiating the transaction.  We turn to this next in considering the role of bank borrowers and 
lenders in initiating private sector credit expansion. 
 
II(D)(b) Private Sector Lending: Who takes the initiative? 
Let us start with the instance most favourable to the claim that bank loans create deposits, that is 
the occasion when a bank makes a term loan, or grants a mortgage, and does so by, indeed, writing 
up both sides of the balance sheet.  What would happen if the bank client had not, beforehand and 
expressly, asked the bank to do so?  Picture yourself as a bank client in a situation where, without 
your leave, the bank increases both a claim on you and a deposit liability to you.  Since the interest 
on the bank loan is (almost always) significantly greater than the deposit interest, the bank would be 
benefiting at your expense.  You would, rightly, be furious, and, if necessary, seek to take legal action 
against the bank. 
 
The crucial point is that the bank does not initiate the bank loan; the borrower does.  Banks are in a 
service industry, like restaurants and hotels.  Banks set out the terms and conditions under which 
they will grant a loan, and then wait for private sector clients to approach them, rather as 
restaurants set out their menus and prices.  You may respond that, even if a private sector potential 
borrower appears to meet all of a bank’s stated conditions, a bank can still veto the proposed deal 
and send the prospective borrower away.  But equally a restaurant can refuse to serve a client 
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because (s)he is improperly dressed, drunk, too noisy, with an animal, or for a range of other 
reasons. 
 
Rather than claim that banks create credit, and then such loans create money, it would be much 
nearer the truth to say that the private sector creates credit and money for itself, and that the 
banking sector is the medium through which private sector clients do so, on the terms and 
conditions set out by the banks. 
 
This latter becomes even clearer when we turn from term loans and mortgage to overdrafts and 
credit card lending.7  In this latter case the key initial decision is the limit of borrowing that the bank 
will honour.  The borrower normally pays a small sum for the ability to borrow for a particular 
duration up to an agreed limit, and then the activation of that right is entirely in the hands of the 
borrower.  The bank does not write up both sides of its balance sheet.  The first time that the bank is 
aware of the transaction is when the payment order, by cheque, card or otherwise, comes in from 
the borrower.  The bank then writes up the loan side of its book, while the counterpart is a debit to 
another bank, or to another customer of the same bank.  The key initial decision is that of the 
private sector borrower to agree an (overdraft) facility with the bank, on the terms and conditions 
set by the bank.  Thereafter the timing and usage of that facility are (almost) entirely in the hands of 
the borrower, not of the bank.  Indeed the bank in most such cases would be legally committed to 
doing so. 
 
In a world in which the cash flows of private sector agents can fluctuate sharply in an unpredictable 
manner, such overdraft facilities are extremely valuable, even when unused.  In so far as the cash 
flow fluctuations are random, the banks can even them out overall through the law of large 
numbers.  Thus overdraft and credit card lending represents a sizeable proportion of total private 
sector lending, exclusive of mortgage loans, see Appendix 1. 
 
Thus, the timing and activation of much actual bank borrowing is done entirely at the initiative of the 
private sector borrower, not of the bank.  Fluctuations in such borrowing are far from random.  
                                                          
7   As recognised in the Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report on ‘The role of banks, non-banks and the central 
bank in the money creation process’, (2017). 
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Thus, following the bankruptcy of Lehman Bros in September 2008, there was quite a large increase 
in bank lending to the private sector in the UK and Eurozone despite the sharp decline in activity, see 
Table 3.  This was to some large, but unknowable, extent driven by borrowers’ fears that banks 
might either become insolvent, (and therefore be unable to honour their overdraft commitment), or 
would seek as soon as possible to lessen the scale of their facility,8 or to withdraw it entirely.  It, 
therefore, became temporarily worthwhile to protect access to liquidity by paying the adverse 
spread, while shifting the resulting deposit to a safer bank.  So in this quarter (Q4, 2008) there was 
the remarkable coincidence of a (temporary) surge in bank lending and deposits exactly at the time 
when the banking system was trying to cut back on facilities and new lending agreements as fast as 
it could.  From the viewpoint of overall liquidity and purchasing power, it was the latter effect 
(rather than the former) that mattered.  The banks were tightening terms and conditions of lending 
drastically in Q4 2008, and underlying liquidity was falling sharply then, not rising. 
 
Table 3 
Bank Lending to the Private Sector 
 
 UK 
£ bn 
Eurozone 
€ bn 
2008 Q2 2246 8786 
Q3 2318 8928 
Q4 2395 8953 
2009 Q1 2462 8965 
Q2 2422 8934 
Sources: BoE, ECB 
 
 
More generally, turning points in the cycle are frequently related to unexpected declines in sales and 
increases in inventories at the start of the downturn, and the reverse at the start of the recovery.  So 
there is likely to be an unexpected shortfall in cash flow in the former case, and vice versa in the 
latter case.  Then the unexpected cash flows may be, quite largely, met by calling on used overdraft 
facilities.  This helps to explain why the contemporaneous relationship between changes in GDP and 
in bank lending is often counter-cyclical, although the relationship between GDP growth and lagged 
bank credit is strongly positive, see Jakab and Kumhof, (2015, p. 36). 
 
                                                          
8   The author’s personal overdraft limit was summarily reduced by his bank in November 2008 from £10 
thousand to £2 thousand. 
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To summarise, in dealing with the private sector, the commercial banking sector acts as a service 
industry, setting out the terms and conditions on which it will provide its financial services, notably 
including loan and mortgage provision.  Given these, its private sector clients then make most of the 
running, determining the timing and amount of bank credit provision.  The key variables are the 
banks’ choice of such terms and conditions and the private sector’s appetite for borrowing (on such 
terms) from the banks.  Seen in this light, the claim that bank credit is the genesis of money creation 
without any mention of the private sector’s key role in the process amounts to a misrepresentation. 
 
That said, the banks’ influence on the rate of growth of both loans and deposits, via shifts in setting 
their terms and conditions, can still be large and significant.  Although the level of short-term 
interest rates is set by the monetary authorities, the spread between deposit and lending rates is 
controlled by the commercial banks; and this spread is generally found to be a significant factor in 
determining the growth rate of both loans and deposits.9  Similarly, changes in banks’ risk aversion 
can trigger sizeable fluctuations in the provision of lending limits, both overdraft and credit card, and 
in required terms for collateral and margin.  But, partly because time series data on unused facilities 
and lending terms are scarce,10 the actual contribution of banks to the growth of loans and deposits 
has not been satisfactorily modelled, or even properly analysed. 
 
II(D)(c) Reaching an Equililbrium? 
What we argued in the previous sub-section was that, having set the terms and conditions on which 
they will lend to (private sector) clients, banks are largely passive in the face of (short term) 
fluctuations in private sector (client) demand for such loans.  Assume that there is an unexpected 
surge in the demand for such loans; what can banks then do in response?  There are a variety of 
possible responses:- 
(1) Expand liabilities to match, if necessary via wholesale funding. 
(2) Reduce other assets, e.g. via securitisation or sales. 
                                                          
9   N.B.  If the spread goes to zero, it is rational for borrowers to both borrow and hold extra deposits until the 
marginal utility of extra liquidity goes to zero.  If the spread rises indefinitely, borrowing will fall to zero. 
 
10   US data on overdrafts and credit lines seem as scanty in the USA as in the UK.  There is some limited data 
on consumer revolving credit, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/g19.pdf, and on small 
business credit card use, https://www.frbservices.org/communications/payment_system_research.html, but 
not much else. 
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(3) Tighten terms and conditions, and/or reduce overdraft limits. 
 
Which course any bank will take will depend on their objectives and the constraints on their actions 
arising from capital requirements, the competitive milieu, etc.  The monetary base multiplier 
assumed that the availability of cash was the key restraint; while this claim was always exaggerated, 
we have argued that, under present conditions, there is no effective liquidity constraint; rather a 
liquidity trap. 
 
Option (3) is a medium horizon response, probably depending most on the pressures of competition, 
profitability and capital limits. 
 
The choice between options (1) and (2) will depend on capital limits and the relative profitability of 
these alternatives. 
 
The banking system is moving from a condition in which liquidity was, especially at times of crises, a 
key constraint to one in which capital requirements are, most often, the main external constraint.  
Moreover, how bankers respond, notably in setting terms and conditions for lending, depends on 
the state of competition and their business models, or, in other words, their micro-founded 
objectives.  Yet such a model of banking, which is based on such micro-foundations, with capital 
requirements as the main external constraint, is currently conspicuous by its absence. 
 
To conclude, at present we have no satisfactory model of the supply of money, or of the working of 
the banking system. 
 
III. Flexibility versus Control 
 
What I have sought to emphasise in the previous Sections is that banks provide a service, of access 
to liquidity, and that the initiative to make use of that service, on the terms and conditions set by the 
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CB and the banks jointly, comes from the borrowers, both public and private sector, not from the 
banks.  On this view, it is nearer the truth to state that the private sector creates credit for itself, 
using the banks as an intermediary and vehicle for this purpose, rather than focussing on the banks 
as the driving force in this exercise. 
 
This service, of providing access to liquidity, is extremely valuable.  Stein (2013, pp 3/4) put this very 
well, 
“One of the primary economic functions of banks and other financial intermediaries, such as 
broker- dealers, is to provide liquidity--that is, cash on demand--in various forms to their 
customers. Some of this liquidity provision happens on the liability side of the balance sheet, 
with bank demand deposits being a leading example. But, importantly, banks also provide 
liquidity via committed lines of credit. Indeed, it is probably not a coincidence that these two 
products--demand deposits and credit lines--are offered under the roof of the same 
institution; the underlying commonality is that both require an ability to accommodate 
unpredictable requests for cash on short notice.  A number of other financial intermediary 
services, such as prime brokerage, also embody a significant element of liquidity provision. 
 
Without question, these liquidity-provision services are socially valuable. On the liability 
side, demand deposits and other short-term bank liabilities are safe, easy-to-value claims 
that are well suited for transaction purposes and hence create a flow of money-like benefits 
for their holders.  And loan commitments are more efficient than an arrangement in which 
each operating firm hedges its future uncertain needs by “pre-borrowing" and hoarding the 
proceeds on its own balance sheet; this latter approach does a poor job of economizing on 
the scarce aggregate supply of liquid assets.” 
 
But, as Stein goes on to say (ibid, pp 4/5), 
“At the same time, as the financial crisis made painfully clear, the business of liquidity 
provision inevitably exposes financial intermediaries to various forms of run risk. That is, in 
response to adverse events, their fragile funding structures, together with the binding 
liquidity commitments they have made, can result in rapid outflows that, absent central 
bank intervention, lead banks to fire-sell illiquid assets or, in a more severe case, to fail 
altogether. And fire sales and bank failures--and the accompanying contractions in credit 
availability--can have spillover effects to other financial institutions and to the economy as a 
whole. Thus, while banks will naturally hold buffer stocks of liquid assets to handle 
unanticipated outflows, they may not hold enough because, although they bear all the costs 
of this buffer stocking, they do not capture all of the social benefits, in terms of enhanced 
financial stability and lower costs to taxpayers in the event of failure. It is this externality 
that creates a role for policy.” 
 
Actually the problems are even worse, since confidence and optimism in economic upturns will lead 
banks to offer easier terms and conditions, (and run down their liquidity buffers), just at the moment 
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when the private sector will want to borrow more.  And both the monetary and fiscal authorities 
may well get infected by that same optimism, and the availability of higher tax receipts, and fail to 
provide a sufficient counter-balance.  So, the system is inherently and inevitably procyclical.  Such 
procyclicality can degenerate into a boom/bust crisis. 
 
So, how do, and should, the monetary authorities find the correct balance between control, to 
stabilise the macro-economy, and flexibility, to allow banks to offer their clients access to liquid with 
most ease and efficiency?  Those putting greater weight on ‘Control’ gravitate towards the Currency 
School (Laina, 2015); those putting more weight on flexibility to the Banking School (Goodhart and 
Jensen, 2015). 
 
The pendulum between these desiderata naturally swings depending on the accidents of history.  
The worse the recent financial boom/bust experience, the greater the tendency to go for control, 
even at some expense in efficiency, growth and flexibility.  The greater the prior experience of 
stability, and the greater the ingenuity of the bankers, the more is the banking system allowed to 
generate flexibility and (apparent) efficiency.  This provides yet another facet to the Minsky dictum 
that ‘stability breeds instability’. 
 
Historically the Banking School thought that the answer to the question of finding the right balance 
lay in following the ‘Real Bills’ doctrine.  Under this approach banks should distinguish between 
lending to finance trade and production, and discriminate against financing for speculative purposes.  
‘Real’ in this sense meant trade related, as contrasted with speculative.  This was desirable, 
according to its adherents, on macro-economic, monetary policy grounds, since a version of the 
Quantity Equation, MV = PY, indicated that if M rose in line with Y (Y – real output), then P, the price 
level would remain roughly constant.  It was also desirable  for financial stability purposes, since 
trade-related lending  could, and would, be paid back from the receipts of the sales/output; in 
contrast speculative lending would only get repaid if the relevant prices did rise. 
 
Thus the ‘real bills’ doctrine seemed both to unify, and to satisfy, both price and stability 
stabilisation objectives.  Note, however, that housing and property finance was assumed to be 
outside the functions of a commercial banking system, as was the case until the second half of the 
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20th Century.  In the latter half of the 19th Century, this ‘real bills’ doctrine, and the Banking School 
came to dominate.  The Federal Reserve System, established in 1913, was consciously set up to 
follow this model.   
 
The doctrine was, however, anathema to the Currency School.  Trade and output, and hence ‘real 
bills’ fluctuate procyclically.  So, following this approach both allows output to rise above equilibrium 
in a boom, and fall, sometimes way below it, in a depression.  The collapse of trade and output in the 
USA in 1929-33 meant that the Fed had insufficient trade bills to rediscount.  The Great Depression 
led to the demise of the ‘real bills’ doctrine and the re-emergence of Currency School proposals to 
control monetary expansion, and to stop runs, e.g. The Chicago Plan.   
 
So, here we are again, in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis, wondering whether the 
structure of banking should shift somewhat back towards ‘Control’ and away from ‘Flexibility’.  The 
latest eminent author to try to find the optimal balance between these two objectives is Lord King, 
whose proposals are set out in Chapter 7 on ‘Innocence Regained: Reforming Money and Banking’ in 
his book The End of Alchemy, (2016). 
 
The rest of this Section contains a commentary of his proposals, suggesting how I would prefer to 
tweak them in order to achieve my own preferred balance between flexibility and control.  His basic 
principle (p. 271) is “to ensure that banks11 will always have sufficient access to cash to meet the 
demands of depositors and others supplying short-term unsecured debt”.  For this purpose,  
 
“Each bank would decide how much of its assets it would position in advance at the central 
bank – that is, how much of the relevant assets the central bank would be allowed to 
examine and which would then be available for use as collateral.  For each type of asset the 
central bank would calculate the haircut it would apply when deciding how much cash it 
would lend against that asset. Adding up all assets that had been pre-positioned, it would 
then be clear how much central bank money the bank would be entitled to borrow at any 
instant. Because these arrangements would have been put in place well ahead of any crisis, 
there would be no difficulty in the central bank agreeing to lend at a moment's notice. The 
assessment of collateral, and the calculation of haircuts, have become routine since the 
crisis and would become a normal function of a central bank….  The amount which a bank 
                                                          
11   This focus on banks does raise the question of how to handle ‘shadow banks’ who may issue liquid 
liabilities, which may have some monetary attributes despite not counting formally as deposits. 
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was entitled to borrow against pre-positioned collateral, added to its existing central bank 
reserves,  is a measure of the 'effective liquid assets' of a bank. 
 
The second step is to look at the liabilities side of a bank's balance sheet – its total demand 
deposits and short-term unsecured debt (up to, say, one year) – which could run at short 
notice. That total is a measure of the bank's 'effective liquid liabilities'. The regulatory 
requirement on banks and other financial intermediaries would be that their effective liquid 
assets should exceed their effective liquid liabilities. Almost all existing prudential capital 
and liquidity regulation, other than a limit on leverage, could be replaced by this one simple 
rule. The rule would act as a form of mandatory insurance so that in the event of a crisis a 
central bank would be free to lend on terms already agreed and without the necessity of a 
penalty rate on its loans. The penalty, or the price of the insurance, would be encapsulated 
by the haircuts required by the central bank on different forms of collateral.” 
 
With his emphasis on maintaining an appropriate balance between the maturity and liquidity of 
assets and liabilities, King is , in several respects, much closer to the Banking School than to the 
Currency School. 
 
The Banking School was even keener, than was the Currency School, on restricting bank assets to 
short-term and/or liquefiable assets.  Thus Bagehot, a leading member of the Banking School, in the 
April 1861 edition of The Economist, in the article on ‘How to read Joint Stock bank accounts’, 
warned against judging a bank primarily on the adequacy of its capital and reserves. Rather, ‘we 
should add together all the liabilities of the bank – its circulation, its drafts, and its deposits: see 
what the total is carefully; and then we should compare it with the amount of cash, loans to bill 
brokers, Government securities, and other immediately tangible and convertible assets which the 
bank has in hand. If the available money bears a good proportion to the possible claims, the bank is a 
good and secure bank’. On the question of ‘the specific proportion between the cash reserve and 
the liabilities of the bank to the public’, Bagehot refused to ‘lay down any technical or theoretical 
rule upon it’. The cash ratio must be allowed ‘to vary in some degree with the nature of the bank’s 
business’.12  For the Banking School financial and banking stability would be maintained by ensuring 
that bank assets were essentially self-liquefying by relating to current trade.  Longer-term capital 
needs, e.g. for fixed investment, should come from capital markets; speculative finance to buy assets 
(financial or real) should be discouraged; and housing (property) finance mainly provided through 
non-bank, specialist intermediaries.   
                                                          
12   Not for Bagehot rigid control of the banking system through operations on the cash base and a stable 
multiplier. But then, the Banking School was a family matter for him; he had married Eliza Wilson, daughter of 
James Wilson, an early member of the Banking School and founder of The Economist in 1843. See Arnon (2011, 
p. 245).   
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There are, perhaps, three qualifications to Lord King’s proposals that I would make.  The first is that 
access to liquidity by borrowers, drawing on their pre-committed overdraft limits, is as socially 
valuable as preserving the access of depositors to their money.  If the return on assets that can be 
collateralised at the CB is significantly lower than on riskier loans, which cannot be so pre-
positioned, then a complete ban on any excess of effective liabilities greater than effective assets, 
might prevent banks from offering overdraft facilities, credit cards, or any other form of lending 
where the timing and initiative for drawing on the facility was at the command of the borrower, 
since banks might normally then only keep a small buffer of excess effective liquid assets above 
effective liquid liabilities. 
 
This could be handled, however, by switching from an outright ban to a time-varying penalty.  Thus 
the first period, say a month, in which effective liquid liabilities exceeded effective liquid assets 
could have a minimal penalty, but the penalty could build up over time, the longer-held, and greater, 
was that excess, until after some length of time the penalty represented an outright ban.  Care 
would have to be taken to avoid ingenious forms of window-dressing.  The purpose of the exercise, 
however, would be to set the penalty structure so as to allow the continuation of the overdraft and 
credit card system on a day-to-day basis, while continuing to enforce the appropriate relationship 
between the maturity and liquidity of bank assets and liabilities.  King does not go into any detail 
about the penalties that should be applied if effective liabilities should exceed effective assets.  This 
is a lacuna that would need to be rectified if any such reform was to be put into place. 
 
The second qualification is that King’s categorisation of liabilities and assets, in Chapter 7, is very 
broad brush.  He divides liabilities into deposits and short-term (less than one year) unsecured debt 
on the one hand, and longer term debt and equity on the other.  As for assets, these are just divided 
into liquid securities and illiquid loans, see pp 272/73, in what is, admittedly, ‘a simple example’. 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has, however, carried out a much more meticulous 
study of the Available Amount of Stable Funding (ASF) represented by all the various categories of 
liability, e.g. equity has a 100% ASF, see Table 1 in BCBS ‘Basel III: the net stable funding ratio’, 
(October 2014), and equivalently the Required Stable Funding Ratio (RSF) for assets, e.g. cash and 
22 
 
reserves has a zero weight, all assets that are encumbered for a period of one year or more has a 
100% weight, see Table 2, (ibid).  I would interpret King’s position as proposing that calculating and 
enforcing the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) should be the central regulatory control.  Yet King 
does not mention the application or implementation of the NSFR, (it is certainly not in the index).  It 
would be interesting to learn how Lord King would describe the relationship between his own 
suggestions and the NSFR.  Note that neither discuss the structure and form of penalties to be 
imposed if the proposed ratios (excessive effective liabilities or NSFR) become breached. 
 
The third qualification is, on this view, the elephant in the room, that neither King nor the BCBS 
really tackle, which is the issue of the structure of housing finance.  As Lord Turner has illustrated 
several times, banking has ceased to be primarily a vehicle for the (short-term) finance of industry, 
but has become mainly a vehicle for the finance of property, both residential and commercial.  The 
finance of long-term mortgages by short-term funding is inherently dangerous.  Unlike trade finance, 
residential mortgages, and some forms of commercial real estate loans, do not generate income in 
due course and are hence not self-financing.  Until the 1980s most residential mortgages in the UK 
were provided by specialist institutions, the Building Societies.  What is needed is a long careful look 
at the present structure of housing finance. 
 
In his book, King remarks, p. 258, that those who set risk weights “did not imagine how risky 
mortgage lending… would become,” but otherwise he does not mention mortgage lending on 
property in his Chapter on ‘Reform Money and Banking’; meanwhile the BCBS still gives such 
residential mortgage lending a risk weighting advantage over other longer-term loans (65% vs 85 or 
100%), (see Table 2, op cit).  it is precisely because mortgage lending for house purchase, especially 
for first-time buyers, is the most politically favoured form of lending that it needs the most 
dispassionate and rigorous analysis.  In all the hullabaloo about the transgressions of banks and 
bankers, the central role of inappropriate and unwise property finance has almost slipped by 
unnoticed. 
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Conclusions 
 
Bank clients can get access to cash, to the ultimate form of liquidity, in two ways, either by drawing 
on their deposits or on their precommitted lines of credit, (overdrafts or credit (card) limits).  It is the 
thesis of this paper that both mechanisms for making payments are, almost equally, socially 
valuable.  Virtually no one denies that the need to ensure access for depositors to their money.  My 
argument is that it is just as important to enable potential borrowers to arrange, and then utilise, 
their overdraft facilities.  The danger of most narrow bank proposals is that they could preclude the 
latter role of banks. 
 
In this latter role, banks play a major role in negotiating the terms and conditions on which overdraft 
(credit card) lines and limits are set.  But once such negotiations are completed, banks are essentially 
passive.  The timing, and amount, of such bank lending to the private sector is then initiated by the 
private sector itself, not by the banks.  So, it would be nearer the truth to say that bank lending to 
the private sector is driven by the private sector’s demand for money, on the terms and conditions 
set by banks, rather than bank lending creates deposits. 
 
The part of banking business where the ethos and approach of narrow banking would be most 
valuable relates to property finance.  If banks were forbidden from issuing long-term mortgages until 
they had arranged appropriate backing from long-term funding, banking would become much safer.  
Moreover, the process of house purchases is generally so long drawn-out that delays caused by the 
need for banks to arrange appropriate funding should not be too onerous, (in contrast, most credit 
card and business overdraft borrowers need to make immediate payments).  Perhaps because of the 
political sensitivities involved, proponents of the narrow banking idea rarely apply that approach 
specifically to housing finance, where it would do most good. 
 
In his book, Lord King seeks to find an optimal balance between ‘Control’ and ‘Flexibility’ by applying 
a, rather broad brush, stable funding ratio approach.  I would broadly concur with the thrust of his 
arguments, subject to:- 
(i) Refining the categories, along the lines of the BCBS’ NSFR. 
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(ii) Setting the penalty structure in such a way as to safeguard the overdraft (credit card) 
systems. 
(iii) Constructing a safer, and perhaps separable, structure for property finance, possibly 
along narrow banking lines. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Reliance on unused overdraft facilities in the UK differs markedly between sectors.  The Bank of 
England publishes statistics on committed credit facilities and on credit (lending) outstanding.  The 
difference between the two is a good proxy for unused (or undrawn) facilities.  These statistics are 
broken down by UK industries and credit to individuals (the latter includes credit card facilities).  The 
data are available on the Bank’s website (Table C1.2 in Bankstats).  The overall figure derived (total 
facilities outstanding less total lending outstanding) for the latest date, July 2015, comes to about 
£417 billion, or 18.2% of total loans outstanding.  However, reliance on unused overdrafts differs 
greatly between sectors, as shown in Table X below.  It is very low in lending to other financial 
intermediaries, (except for insurance companies and pension funds) and to individuals on 
mortgages, (below 5%).  It is much higher for lending to manufacturing, (nearly 120%), utilities 
(138%), trade (74%), transport and information (101%), construction (42%) and other (non-mortgage 
related) loans to individuals (62%).  In short, if one strips out the network of intra-financial loans and 
the (massive) mortgage business, then the usage of committed, but undrawn, overdraft facilities is a 
central feature of the working of the British banking system. 
Table X 
(from Bankstats C1.2) 
 
July 2015 
Lending in All Currencies 
 
 
Agriculture Fishing 
Mining & 
Quarrying Manufacturing Utilities Construction 
Wholesale & 
Retail 
Accommo- 
dation 
Amounts 
Outstanding 
17,104 244 6,353 35,625 13,644 35,330 41,723 22,684 
Amounts of Facilities 
Less Amounts 
Outstanding 
6,535 66 26,411 42,261 18,839 14,975 30,825 5,953 
2 as a % of 1 38.2% 27% 415% 118.6% 138% 42.5% 74% 26% 
 
 
 
Transport 
Real Estate,  
Services & 
Support 
Admin, 
Education, 
Health Recreation 
Financial 
Intermediation 
Insurance Co. 
& Pension 
Funds 
Auxiliary 
Financial 
Amounts 
Outstanding 
28,657 176,894 41,455 8,815 383,347 25,595 253,881 
Amounts of Facilities 
Less Amounts 
Outstanding 
28,867 51,557 8.833 3,891 37,524 9,125 4,433 
2 as a % of 1 101% 29% 21.5% 44% 9.8% 35.5% 1.75% 
 
 
 Total Financial & 
Non-Financial 
Businesses 
Individuals 
Housing 
Individuals 
Other Loans 
Total 
Individuals 
Loans 
Total 
UK Residents 
Amounts Outstanding 1,091,352 1,083,111 120,139 1,203,250 2,294,602 
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Amounts of Facilities 
Less Amounts Outstanding 
290,095 32,110 74,709 126,820 416,914 
2 as a % of 1 26.6% 4.8% 62% 10.5% 18.16% 
 
 
 
Unused overdraft facilities are as much immediate liquid purchasing power as bank deposits, as 
Keynes noted in his Treatise on Money (1930).13  In principle one should consider aggregating the 
two together, but previously one could not do so because the UK banks had been unwilling to 
provide the data, (until quite recently).  When the government tried to control bank lending by 
quantitative ceilings, prior to the Competition and Credit Control reform of 1971, one claim that the 
banks made was that they could not control such lending because it was pre-committed via 
overdraft facilities.  So, as documented in Goodhart (2015b), the Treasury then, e.g. in the late 
1960s, sought to ask the banks for data on such facilities, but the banks refused, (correctly fearing 
that the authorities would seek a quantitative limit on such facilities); the authorities, the Treasury 
and the Bank, did not, however, press the case then, possibly on the grounds that any limit on 
formal, legal, borrowing facilities might be avoided by their transformation into informal 
agreements. 
  
                                                          
13   Ibid, pp 42-3, 
“The reader must notice that it is not the amount of the customer's used overdraft appearing on the 
asset side of the bank's balance-sheet, but the amount of his unused overdraft, which does not (at 
present) appear anywhere at all in a bank's statement of its assets and liabilities, which corresponds 
to a cash-deposit; ㅡso that it is the total of the cash-deposits and the unused overdraft facilities 
outstanding which together make up the total of Cash Facilities. Properly speaking, unused overdraft 
facilitiesㅡsince they represent a liability of the bankㅡought, in the same way as acceptances, to 
appear on both sides of the account. But at present this is not so, with the result that there exists in 
unused overdraft facilities a form of Bank-Money of growing importance, of which we have no 
statistical record whatever, whether as regards the absolute aggregate amount of it or as regards the 
fluctuations in this amount from time to time. 
 
Thus the Cash Facilities, which are truly cash for the purposes of the Theory of the Value of Money, by 
no means correspond to the Bank Deposits which are published. The latter include an important 
proportion of something which is scarcely money at all (not much more than e.g. a Treasury Bill is), 
namely the savings-deposits; whilst, on the other hand, they take no account of something which is a 
Cash Facility, in the fullest sense of the term, namely unused overdraft facilities. So long as savings-
deposits and unused overdraft facilities are both of them a nearly constant proportion of the total 
deposits, the figures of Bank Deposits as published are a sufficiently satisfactory index of the amount 
of Cash available. But if, as we shall see subsequently, these proportions are capable of wide 
fluctuations, then we may be seriously misled, as indeed many people have been misled, by treating 
Bank Deposits as identical with Cash.” 
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